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Abstract and Keywords
Given the potentially powerful effects of gene editing for human lives, it seems 
reasonable to reflect on the issue from a variety of scientific, moral, cultural, and 
religious perspectives to help us deploy this technology with a clear eye to all its 
possible implications. Given the global impact genetic modification will likely 
have, an inquiry seriously engaging with the values and ideals of non-Western 
cultures and societies will be helpful to achieve the sort of balanced 
understanding that will enable a proper evaluation. This chapter examines the 
account of well-being found in the Daoist classic, the Zhuangzi, and highlights 
some insights that can be fruitfully explored in the context of the ethics of gene 
editing. The thesis is that, from the perspective of Zhuangzi’s conception of 
human flourishing, there are reasons for rejecting the use of genetic 
modification technology.
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Given the potentially powerful effects of gene editing for human lives, it seems 
reasonable to reflect on the issue from a variety of scientific, moral, cultural, and 
religious perspectives to help us deploy this technology with a clear eye to all its 
possible implications. Given the global impact genetic modification will likely 
have, an inquiry seriously engaging with the values and ideals of non-Western 
cultures and societies will be helpful to achieve the sort of balanced 
understanding that will enable a proper evaluation.
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The focus of this chapter is on one of the oldest, richest, and most influential 
moral traditions that arose in early China: Daoism. One key feature of Daoism, 
shared by other great philosophical traditions of early China such as 
Confucianism and Mohism, is its practical orientation. Although the Daoist texts 
represent a number of intriguing philosophical positions, they ultimately aim at 
helping readers achieve human fulfillment. Like the great eudaemonist 
traditions of the West such as Stoicism or Aristotelianism (see Daniel Haybron’s 
Chapter 2, this volume), at the heart of the Daoist philosophical tradition is the 
attainment of flourishing or well-being. (I use these terms interchangeably.) This 
chapter examines the account of well-being found in the Daoist classic, the 
Zhuangzi, and highlights some insights that can be fruitfully explored in the 
context of the ethics of gene editing. My thesis is that from the perspective of 
Zhuangzi’s conception of human flourishing, we have reasons to think we should 
reject the use of genetic modification technology. In this chapter, I do not 
attempt to settle whether, all things considered, those reasons are strong 
enough to support the rejection of any one form or use, much less all, of gene 
editing.
Gene editing technologies can be aimed at a variety of purposes, including what 
bioethicists refer to as “therapy” and “enhancement.” Giubilini and Sanyal 
defined enhancement as “biomedical interventions to improve human capacities, 
performances, dispositions, and well-being beyond the traditional scope of 
therapeutic medicine.”2 Therapy, on the other hand, is understood as the 
restoration of human capacities to their normal or characteristic function.3 This 
chapter explores reasons to think we should reject the use of human genetic 
modification technologies generally, when put to both enhancement and 
therapeutic ends. Because the therapeutic use of gene editing, at least for 
somatic  (p.73) engineering, is widely accepted, Zhuangzi’s views will strike 
most readers as extreme (and perhaps unhelpful) in deepening our ethical 
understanding of the topic of gene editing.4 But even if a wholesale endorsement 
of Zhuangzi’s views is unlikely, there are elements of his thinking that merit 
careful consideration and can draw attention to possible negative consequences 
of deploying human gene editing technologies.
Zhuangzi’s primary goal was not to build a coherent ethical system or uncover a 
set of fundamental moral principles. In line with many of the Hellenistic 
philosophers like the Stoics and Epicureans, Zhuangzi sought to reshape the 
reader’s fundamental beliefs and attitudes in ways that advance their 
achievement of “the good life.” Like Wittgenstein, we can see Zhuangzi as 
carrying out a form of philosophical therapy, although unlike Wittgenstein, his 
main goal was not to untangle or dissolve philosophical issues but to instill in the 
readers a fresh set of perspectives that can counter our common psychological 
propensity toward anxiety. In the next section I discuss the notion of the 
“heavenly perspective,” which Zhuangzi believed offers an important tool for 
sustaining an attitude of detachment and equanimity. (As we will see, this 
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concept is unconnected to an appeal to God or deities.) We also explore what I 
call the virtue of spontaneity that Zhuangzi took as an important feature of 
human flourishing. Finally, I draw on Zhuangzi’s views about the human good to 
identify some possible reasons against the use of genetic modification 
technologies.
Zhuangzi’s Account of Flourishing: Heavenly Perspective and the Virtue of 
Spontaneity
The Zhuangzi, like the other classical Daoist text the Daodejing, is generally 
believed to be the work of more than one author, integrating ideas from multiple 
sources. Nevertheless, the text as a whole presents a substantive vision of what 
matters in life and the sorts of dispositions and attitudes we should cultivate to 
obtain a life that goes well for us. The goal of this section is to highlight the core 
elements of Zhuangzi’s conception of well-being.5 Given the text’s complexity 
and rich history, I am by no means offering a definitive interpretation. 
Nevertheless, I believe the discussion that follows captures key aspects of 
Zhuangzi’s philosophical vision.
One of the central features of the positive vision of human flourishing advanced 
by Zhuangzi is freedom from the ordinary concerns that are constitutive of the 
struggle and anxiety permeating day-to-day life:
Sweating and laboring to the end of his days and never seeing his 
accomplishments, utterly exhausting himself and never knowing where to 
look  (p.74) for rest—can you help pitying him? I’m not dead yet! he says, 
but what good is that? His body decays, his mind follows it—can you deny 
that this is a great sorrow? Man’s life has always been a muddle like this.6
Zhuangzi offered a diagnosis of the ills that trouble us: moving without pause or 
rest from one task to another, we are so preoccupied with everyday affairs that 
our minds are incapable of finding genuine rest. This is a common psychological 
state that will resonate with most of us.
As Zhuangzi observed, our psychological disturbances are often the product of 
our inability to satisfy our numerous and ever-expanding set of desires. Of 
course, one way of resolving this predicament would be to find a way of 
satisfying all of our desires, but that is clearly a practically (perhaps even 
logically) impossible task. Rather, Zhuangzi suggested we need to cultivate a 
different perspective, one that builds and sustains a kind of equanimity that can 
shield us from the psychological pressures that afflict our minds. This 
perspective, which recent scholars, including Justin Tiwald and Philip J. Ivanhoe, 
have labeled the “heavenly perspective,” offers a vantage point from which value 
distinctions and categories fade away, and every event is considered simply a 
part of the grand process of change: “Whether you point to a little stalk or a 
great pillar, a leper or the beautiful Xishi, things ribald and shady, or things 
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grotesque and strange, the Way makes them all into one.”7 (I explain the Daoist 
notion of “the Way” in material that follows.)
To help understand this perspective, Justin Tiwald suggested reflecting on a 
“broad, panoramic, view of the universe over the fullness of time, and how 
human value distinctions, pretenses to knowledge, and absolutism must seem 
from that perspective.”8 As I discuss further in this chapter, Zhuangzi was not 
advocating the heavenly perspective as the only proper way of seeing the world, 
but calling attention to its practical advantages. For example, the heavenly 
perspective loosens our confidence in the truth of our judgments concerning 
what is valuable or good, thereby allowing us to become more receptive to new 
ideas.9
Hold on to all that you have received from Heaven, but do not think you 
have gotten anything. Be empty, that is all. The Perfect Man uses his mind 
like a mirror—going after nothing, welcoming nothing, responding but not 
storing. Therefore he can win out over things and not hurt himself.10
Being able to detach ourselves from our preconceived judgments and values, we 
place ourselves in a position of receptivity, cultivating an open-minded attitude. 
The heavenly perspective protects us from prematurely blocking off worthwhile 
considerations that may strike us as unappealing or even ludicrous. Another 
advantage is that by admitting the fallibility of our judgments, we are less 
anxious  (p.75) about being in error and can detach ourselves from the kind of 
intellectual pride that is often the source of much personal frustration, as well as 
fruitless bickering.
Looking to help the readers cultivate the proper frame of mind to grasp the 
heavenly perspective, Zhuangzi concocted a combination of (at times outlandish) 
parables and rhetorical questions:
Now let me ask you some questions. If a man sleeps in a damp place, his 
back aches and he ends up half paralyzed, but is this true of a loach? If he 
lives in a tree, he is terrified and shakes with fright, but is this true of a 
monkey? Of these three creatures, then, which one knows the proper place 
to live? Men eat the flesh of grass-fed and grain-fed animals, deer eat 
grass, centipedes find snakes tasty, and hawks and falcons relish mice. Of 
these four, which knows how food ought to taste? Monkeys pair with 
monkeys, deer go out with deer, and fish play around with fish. Men claim 
that Maoqiang and Lady Li were beautiful; but if fish saw them, they would 
dive to the bottom of the stream; if birds saw them, they would fly away; 
and if deer saw them, they would break into a run. Of these four, which 
knows how to fix the standard of beauty for the world? The way I see it, the 
rules of benevolence and righteousness, and the paths of right and wrong 
Daoism, Flourishing, and Gene Editing
Page 5 of 15
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.  
Subscriber: Loyola University of Chicago; date: 26 September 2019
all are hopelessly snarled and jumbled. How could I know anything about 
such discriminations?11
The primary function of these questions is to help the reader recognize that 
while our value judgments about beauty, welfare, or morality may seem 
indubitable to us (from both an individual and species-level point of view), they 
arise out of our own necessarily limited perspective. Indeed, from the 
perspective of every creature, what appears good or beautiful will seem obvious, 
and it is all too natural for us to move from what we find appealing to universal 
claims about what is absolutely good or beautiful, a significant mistake in 
Zhuangzi’s eyes. Coming to recognize the degree to which our evaluative 
judgments vary depending on the particular perspective from which the 
judgment is made will make us less dogmatic in our stance and enable us to 
flexibly employ a wider range of considerations to resolve intellectual and 
practical challenges. Consider the following allegory:
When the monkey trainer was handing out acorns, he said, “You get three 
in the morning and four at night.” This made all the monkeys furious. 
“Well, then,” he said, “you get four in the morning and three at night.” The 
monkeys were all delighted. There was no change in the reality behind the 
words, and yet the monkeys responded with joy and anger. Let them, if 
they want to. So the sage harmonizes with both right and wrong and rests 
in Heaven the Equalizer. This is called walking two roads.12
 (p.76) We can imagine a less amenable monkey trainer stubbornly sticking to 
his plan to give three acorns in the morning and four at night, remarking with 
exasperation, “What difference does it make if they get four now and three 
later?” As it turns out, there is a significant difference from the monkeys’ point 
of view, recognized by the astute trainer who simply adjusted to their 
preferences. Commenting on this passage, Thomas Merton described Zhuangzi’s 
normative vision as “at home on two levels: that of the divine and invisible [D]ao 
that has no name, and that of ordinary, simple, everyday existence.”13 As Merton 
went on to explain, despite initial appearances, Zhuangzi wasn’t suggesting that 
we permanently stay within the heavenly perspective, detaching ourselves from 
every human desire and end. Rather, Zhuangzi was suggesting that we should 
seek to live well in the world as it is and to harmonize both the heavenly and 
human perspectives.14 On this picture, we continue to strive for the realization 
of certain goals, while recognizing that from the cosmic perspective our ends 
will appear insignificant. In a number of passages, Zhuangzi offered examples of 
Daoist exemplars that occupied simple, ordinary roles in society—butcher, 
woodcarver, ferry guide—that find a way of achieving the highest levels of 
perfection in their craft, while at the same time having their hearts set on 
following the Way, the Daoist path for achieving the best, most flourishing life. 
These so-called skill stories reveal Zhuangzi’s paradoxical attitude that one must 
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cultivate an attitude of detachment from, and skepticism toward, what we tend 
to value, at the same time manifesting excellence in one’s ordinary work.15
An important element of Zhuangzi’s conception of the flourishing life, as 
exemplified in the skillful practices of the Daoist masters, is living according to 
certain natural, spontaneous, or nonrational tendencies that allow one to move 
along the path of life with dexterity and tranquility, resulting in both 
interpersonal and intrapersonal harmony. Consider this description of the 
psychological state of the master butcher Cook Ding as he cuts up an ox: “And 
now—now I go at it by spirit and don’t look with my eyes. Perception and 
understanding have come to a stop, and spirit moves where it wants. I go along 
with the natural makeup, strike in the big hollows, guide the knife through the 
big openings, and follow things as they are.”16 We can read the butcher’s “flow”-
like activity (to borrow from Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi) metaphorically, referring 
to the way that our lives, when going exceedingly well, also seem to be carried 
along by a certain element of smoothness and effortlessness, where everything 
just seems to hang together properly, allowing us to live with balance and ease. I 
refer to the disposition that allows one to move forward in life with flow and 
tranquility through those nonrational spontaneous drives or inclinations 
identified by Zhuangzi as the virtue of spontaneity.17 The development and 
maintenance of this virtue is one of the core features of the Zhuangzian 
conception of human flourishing.
 (p.77) As scholars have noted, Zhuangzi’s choice of exemplars for articulating 
the best human lives were often those who are deemed least worthy of respect 
in early China: butchers, criminals, and those who are physically disfigured. 
Through these examples, Zhuangzi suggested that the range of lives that can go 
well is much broader than what most would think. As Philip Ivanhoe noted, “By 
calling into question established notions about what constitutes the good and the 
worthy, he illuminated forgotten corners of human dignity. . . . All are part of the 
great dao and each has dignity and worth in itself.”18 This is in stark contrast to 
the prevailing attitudes about human worth in early China, which were closely 
bound with hierarchy and roles. In Zhuangzi’s eyes the cultivation of the 
heavenly perspective allows one to see past culturally constructed norms and 
values and appreciate a sense of oneness that ties together all things, processes, 
and change. In a variety of passages we see Zhuangzi endorsing skepticism 
toward much of what we ordinarily value and accepting all events as simply the 
unfolding of the natural pattern set by heaven.
While cultivating a receptive, let it be attitude may be an effective mindset for 
daily life, one might worry that when confronting tragic events such an attitude 
may be out of place. In one well-known passage, when Zhuangzi’s wife dies, his 
friend Huizi comes to visit only to find him singing in a cheerful mood. Huizi 
chastises him for his callousness, and Zhuangzi responds:
Daoism, Flourishing, and Gene Editing
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When she first died, do you think I didn’t grieve like anyone else? But I 
looked back to her beginning and the time before she was born. Not only 
the time before she was born, but the time before she had a body. Not only 
the time before she had a body, but the time before she had a spirit. In the 
midst of jumble of wonder and mystery, a change took place and she had a 
spirit. Another change and she had a body. Another change and she was 
born. Now there’s been another change she’s dead. It’s just like 
progression of the four seasons: spring, summer, fall, winter.19
One might initially find Zhuangzi’s comparison of the death of a loved one with a 
change in season as perverse. But as we see in the passage, even Zhuangzi 
underwent an initial period of grief. In line with his practical and therapeutic 
aims, we can interpret Zhuangzi as primarily seeking to offer a way to move past 
the experience of grief by taking on the heavenly perspective from which life and 
death appear as both necessary and inevitable events that are charged with 
“wonder and mystery.” In Zhuangzi’s eyes, life and death were mysteries that lie 
beyond the scope of our rational capacity. By framing such events as part of the 
ineffable processes of the natural world, Zhuangzi believed that his readers 
would find comfort that can ease the pain of loss and enable us to move forward 
with our lives. The Zhuangzian spirit is at home in a more intuition-driven, less 
rationally  (p.78) focused way of life that finds consolation in the fact that many 
of life’s most important experiences elude our rational grasp.
The conception of human flourishing that emerges from this discussion 
emphasizes the importance of cultivating an anxiety-free and open-minded 
attitude, with the ability to recognize that the importance we attach to our 
everyday affairs is, at least from a broader, cosmic perspective, insignificant. 
This perspective allows us to maintain equanimity in the face of challenges and 
to prevent ourselves from obsession with any particular goal, as well as 
suggesting that what most think of as meritorious, admirable, or ignoble are 
often the result of mere societal conventions and norms and do not match what 
is truly good from the perspective of the dao: the proper path that leads to the 
most flourishing life. Additionally, through the cultivation of the virtue of 
spontaneity, one leads a less rationally driven, more unencumbered life that 
moves with the grain of one’s natural drives and inclinations.
But as noted, Zhuangzi was not claiming that we should aim to abandon our 
human perspective and extricate ourselves from all desires. As the stories of the 
Daoist exemplars reveal, those whose lives best exemplify the Daoist vision of 
well-being live fairly ordinary, simple lives that conform to basic cultural mores. 
But, in carrying out their ordinary tasks, they demonstrate excellence, and it is 
through their skillfulness that they discover a way to accord with the dao. The 
Daoist image of flourishing isn’t that of a solitary hermit, but of someone living 
at peace in the world, according to one’s natural impulses, harmonizing with 
both nature and other people. In Zhuangzi’s view, much of what we think of as 
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essential or important to our happiness—wealth, good looks, advanced 
technology—tends to distract us from a more enduring, deeper kind of joy that is 
achieved by a simplified life that is attuned to our more basic, natural 
promptings.
To summarize the discussion, let me identify two central elements of Zhuangzi’s 
conception of flourishing:
I. Heavenly Perspective. This perspective prevents narrow-minded 
obsessions over trivial matters by allowing us to see events and people 
from a wider, more cosmic point of view. It allows us to face difficulties 
with equanimity and also to see that the values and norms we endorse 
are not timeless truths, but a product of culture and society, resulting in 
open-mindedness and receptivity toward finding value and worth in 
things and people that otherwise would have been neglected.
II. Virtue of Spontaneity. This virtue allows us to live according to the 
spontaneous inclinations rooted in our nature, which Zhuangzi believed 
will free us from our attachments to worldly goods and enable us to be at 
peace with ourselves and others. Because this form of life is best 
achieved when  (p.79) one is relatively free from worldly attachment—as 
exemplified by the Daoist sages like Cook Ding—it is marked by 
simplicity.
The Ethics of Gene Editing: Lessons from Zhuangzi
How might the use of genetic modification technologies affect the possibility of 
achieving the sort of life that Zhuangzi believed is best for us? Applying the 
values and ideas of an ancient Chinese thinker to a contemporary moral issue is 
bound to be messy, but it is possible to identify some considerations relevant to 
the ethics of gene editing. Given Zhuangzi’s focus on the cultivation of the 
heavenly perspective and the virtue of spontaneity, I suggest that we at least 
have reason to think genetic modification would conflict with the account of 
human well-being proposed by Zhuangzi. The relevant question for our purposes 
is, How might the use of gene editing technology affect the sorts of dispositions 
and attitudes that Zhuangzi saw as essential for obtaining well-being?
One of the best-known objections to human genetic modification has been the 
way that such technologies strengthen what Michael Sandel called our “drive to 
mastery,” thereby undercutting the “enlarged human sympathies that an 
openness to the unbidden can cultivate.”20 Sandel’s core idea was that these 
technologies ultimately discourage the cultivation of certain values and 
dispositions, especially the disposition to accept with humility and gratitude 
human beings as they are, which can foster a sense of solidarity with all people. 
In a similar spirit, Michael Hauskeller comments in this volume, “There is no 
best possible child (in the comparative sense). Instead there are many different 
ways of being good. And if we want to live a good life ourselves, if we want to 
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flourish as human beings and want our children to flourish as well, we need to, 
perhaps more than anything else, recognize the multiple realizability of the good 
(p. 67 in Chapter 4).”21
There are significant elements of Sandel’s and Hauskeller’s normative outlook 
that I think Zhuangzi would find congenial, for example, accepting people as 
they are and recognizing the dignity and worth inherent in everyone. By 
becoming increasingly focused on finding ways to improve human nature and 
design human beings, we seem to go directly against the flexible, open-minded 
attitude that Zhuangzi thought was so crucial for flourishing. Take, for example, 
the attitude expressed by parents who hope to apply genetic technology to 
produce in their children traits such as a certain height, eye color, or level of 
intelligence.22 For Zhuangzi, the common assumption underlying this kind of use 
of genetic technology—that we have a sufficient understanding of which human 
traits are better than others—was dubious, particularly from the heavenly 
perspective. For Zhuangzi, much of our understanding concerning which human 
traits are more or less valuable is the result of cultural influences that far too 
often  (p.80) deter us from really seeing the true worth of things—that is, their 
true worth according to the perspective of heaven. At the very least, we should 
be far less confident about the extent to which we possess such knowledge. 
Besides Zhuangzi’s skepticism regarding our ability to correctly grasp values, 
there are other reasons why Zhuangzi would disapprove of the use of genetic 
modification technologies. I identify three next.
The first reason is that increasing the use of enhancement technologies would 
undermine the kinds of attitudes toward ourselves and the world that Zhuangzi 
thought were essential for living well. So, where Zhuangzi would take “wonder 
and mystery” to be the natural and intuitive responses to the birth of our 
children and the genetic qualities they possess, pervasive use of genetic 
technology could lead us to see birth as the product of human agency.
This is not an assessment shared by everyone. For example, Allen Buchanan has 
argued that even the rampant use of genetic enhancement technology would still 
leave many things outside human control.23 Moreover, as Buchanan also argued, 
not all human interventions in the processes of nature are bad: we cut out 
tumors, develop minds through education and learning, and grow genetically 
modified crops that yield greater quantities of healthier food. While these are 
legitimate points, they don’t completely address the concern that by increasing 
our manipulation of the most profound and mysterious human events such as 
birth and death, we promote the disposition to seek greater control over nature
—a disposition that lies in tension with the more detached attitude of the 
heavenly perspective.24
Daoism, Flourishing, and Gene Editing
Page 10 of 15
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.  
Subscriber: Loyola University of Chicago; date: 26 September 2019
The second reason is that it isn’t clear whether altering the human genome 
would, on the whole, be beneficial for us. On Zhuangzi’s view, the requirements 
for living flourishing lives are much lower than people generally tend to think. A 
fairly simple life, as long as one cultivates the sorts of attitude we’ve identified, 
is sufficient for a high level of flourishing. There is empirical research that 
seems to support this point. In a study on life satisfaction levels by Ed Diener 
and Martin Seligman, the life satisfaction levels of the Forbes magazine’s 
“richest Americans” were equal to the life satisfaction levels of the Pennsylvania 
Amish and the Inughuit (Inuit people in Northern Greenland), even though the 
lives of the Amish and Inughuit rank much lower in economic freedom.25
More important, Zhuangzi suggested that by increasing our options for the 
variety of goods that science generates, our lives are actually made worse—our 
minds are saturated with more expansive desires, which in turn cause greater 
frustration. Again, contemporary empirical research suggests that Zhuangzi was 
onto something. Studies of the Old Order Amish of Pennsylvania showed that 
their rate of nonmanic depression or “common cold depression” occurred at 
roughly between one-fifth and one-tenth of the depression rate among the 
citizens of Baltimore.26 This suggests that even though our lives have much 
greater  (p.81) freedom in choosing from a range of economic goods compared 
to the Amish, in terms of subjective well-being, we may be doing a fair bit worse. 
Of course, to make the warranted judgment that city-dwelling Americans are 
overall doing worse than the Amish would require investigating the well-being of 
both populations as well as a variety of other factors. And while many of us may 
have fleeting thoughts about how wonderful and free it must feel to live like that
—few of us would seriously consider joining the Amish community. One recent, 
notable exception is Matthew Secich, who was a sous chef at a world-renowned 
restaurant but decided after years of deep unhappiness to join the Amish 
community with his wife and family. Describing his current, radically simpler 
life, he commented:
This is far better. You can hear the clock tick. . . . I truly believe God has 
his destiny for all things. From once upon a time being a four-star chef, to 
playing with meat in the backwoods, that was all God’s plan. I feel so 
blessed to be here.27
It’s almost as if Secich was following a prescription suggested by Zhuangzi over 
two millennia ago: “Be content with this time and dwell in this order, and then 
neither sorrow nor joy can touch you. In ancient times this was called the 
‘freeing of the bound.’ There are those who cannot free themselves because they 
are bound by things. But nothing can ever win against Heaven—that’s the way 
it’s always been.”28
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The third reason Zhuangzi would take issue with the use of genetic technology 
draws on Zhuangzi’s view that the heavenly perspective opens us up to see the 
dignity and worth that are present in lives that are too quickly dismissed by 
society. Because genetic enhancement, as scholars like Michael Sandel, 
Adrienne Asch, and Edmund Pellegrino have noted, may promote the sort of 
mindset that led to programs of eugenics in the early twentieth century—sharply 
demarcating what counts as desirable and undesirable traits in human beings; it 
could also decrease our capacity to appreciate just those kinds of lives that 
Zhuangzi saw as carrying the potential to flourish, including those who live with 
extremely unusual physical deformities.29 In her powerful reflection on disability 
in this volume, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (Chapter 1) comments on the 
increasing drive toward removing all forms of genetic anomalies:
People like the four of us have long been the “bad news” of lying-in 
hospitals, delivery rooms, neonatal units, and prenatal imaging and testing
—unexpected arrivals delivered by the Black Stork. In the swiftly 
developing world of genetic engineering, however, people like us are 
identifiable, legible in our distinctiveness and rarity, much earlier in the 
trajectory of medicalized human procreation than in the past. Detecting 
disability through selective testing is  (p.82) carried out now at all 
developmental stages of human reproduction, from the gametic to the 
embryonic to the fetal to the neonatal. Germline interventions would seek 
to prevent people with rare diseases and congenital disabilities from 
coming into being. This pruning of human variation at the genetic level 
proceeds with little considerations of our perspectives as people who live 
out these genetic narratives. Enthusiasts about genetic engineering cite 
facts against us such as those described by the Global Burden of Disease 
Project, which calculates our supposed collective costs without accounting 
for our contributions. We are a vanishing tribe, those of us now detectable 
earlier and earlier in the process of human procreation. We are now often 
culled out before the traits that embryonic and fetal testing reveal are 
brought into being in a lived life.30
The march toward eradicating every genetic aberration has muted the voices of 
those who actually live with such conditions. Not only are we increasingly 
unable to appreciate the contributions that those with disabilities make to 
society, but also we now question whether such people should even exist. 
Consider this comment by the bioethicist Dena Davis:
In my own mind I can discern a subtle shift in the way in which I view 
people with certain anomalies. Twenty years ago, seeing a woman in the 
supermarket with a child who has Down syndrome, my immediate 
reactions were sympathy and a sense that that woman could be me. Now 
that testing for Down syndrome is virtually universal in the United States, 
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when I see such a mother and child I am more likely to wonder why she 
didn’t get tested.31
One aspect of the shift in Davis’s attitude is that now, with advanced 
understanding of genetic screening, there shouldn’t even exist people with 
“anomalies” at all. What is strikingly absent in the thoughts and attitudes of 
those like Davis is the perspective of those who actually carry those anomalies, 
which frequently tells a very different story about what their lives are like. As 
Garland-Thomson describes in Chapter 1 of this volume:
Living in a world not built for us and in a community where the majority of 
members understand themselves and are understood by others as being 
more fortunate, advantaged, better, more able, or healthier than we are 
has been an opportunity. From that place where we have lived our lives, 
many of us have developed a vibrant resourcefulness, interdependence, an 
alternative knowledge base, and a consciousness sometimes perceptible 
only in the recesses of our being, all of which have served us well.32
 (p.83) Zhuangzi tells a story of a man named Ziqi who discovered a large tree 
that he deemed worthless: “He saw that the smaller limbs were gnarled and 
twisted, unfit for beams or rafters, and looking down, he saw that the trunk was 
pitted and rotten and could not be used for coffins. . . . It turns out to be a 
completely unusable tree.”33 But in a flash of Daoist insight Ziqi realized that 
these anomalies had contributed to the tree’s flourishing: “Aha!—it is this 
unusableness that the Holy Man Makes use of!”34
The crucial point Zhuangzi and Garland-Thomson highlighted is that without 
adequate reflection on the perspective of the disabled we will fail to appreciate 
how disabilities may serve as sources of prudential value. But the ability to 
recognize this fact is contingent on having a proper outlook, marked by the kind 
of open-mindedness and acceptance that Zhuangzi advocated throughout the 
text.
Conclusion
The point of this chapter was not to offer decisive reasons against the use of 
genetic modification technologies, but rather to draw attention to certain values 
and perspectives that Zhuangzi took as essential for human flourishing and that 
appear to be in tension with genome modification. Many contemporary readers
—just like many thinkers in Zhuangzi’s own time—will find Zhuangzi’s 
conception of well-being, with its focus on detachment, heavenly perspective, 
and spontaneity, too narrow and implausible. There are two points to note in 
response. The first is that even if Zhuangzi’s vision seems too radical for us, 
there are aspects of that vision, such as the abilities to shift perspectives, to 
detach oneself from particular ends, and to flow with the nonrational intuitive 
inclinations of our nature, that many will find appealing. The second point is 
that, given Zhuangzi’s deep and enduring influence on the some of the best 
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minds of the East, we have reason to believe he may be a resource to help us to 
examine some of our most basic—and therefore least analyzed—assumptions. 
Through deep and sympathetic engagement with profound thinkers of other 
cultures like Zhuangzi, we are less likely to become imprisoned by the particular 
values of our society and culture and more likely to extend our understanding of 
the possibilities for leading good human lives.
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